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CASE SETTING 
Petitioners request the court grant a Rehearing, pursuant to 
Rule 35 Rules of the Supreme Court, of the decision authored by 
Justice Durham and filed July 15, 1987. Counsel for the Peti-
tioner certifies this Petition is presented in good faith and not 
for delay. 
The points of law or fact which the Petitioner claims the 
court has overlooked or misapprehended in this decision are as 
follows: 
I. The promissory note was negotiable and 
accepted by Plaintiffs in lieu of cash and 
was independently enforceable from the 
purchase agreement. 
II. Because the triar of fact determined the 
Defendants themselves had breached the 
contract, the trial court properly decided 
that the mutual breach estopped the Defen-
dants from recovering on the Counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
The judgment below was rendered after jury verdict and 
careful consideration by the trial judge who was familiar with 
the history of the arguments and had presided at several hear-
ings, one "near-trial", and one completed trial. 
1 
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THE NOTE WAS SEPARATELY ENFORCEABLE 
The court granted partial summary judgment on the promissory 
note because the judge considered the note to be independently 
enforceable and because Defendants before trial admitted their 
liability to pay the amount of the note. The Counterclaim was 
based on the purchase agreement. The court concluded the 
Plaintiffs' right to collect on the note was absolute, although 
the Defendants might have a basis to recover on their Counter-
claim. The trial court considered these two documents separately. 
Since any Counterclaim would have to be on the purchase 
agreement rather than the note, the trial court determined 
Defendants' possible recovery on the Counterclaim could be an 
offset on the amount due on the note. However, he also deter-
mined any such recovery was independent of the note. In either 
case, Plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment on the 
note. Appellants spent considerable part of their Brief treating 
i 
the argument that the note and the agreement were not independent 
since they were written at the same time. However, the facts 
support the judgment because these documents were prepared by the 
Defendants' counsel, the note was independent, and Defendants had 
admitted the note was unpaid in the exact amount claimed. The 
triar of fact was justified in treating the note separately. In 
its decision filed July 15, 1987, this court does not appear to 
address the question of treating the purchase agreement separate-
ly from the negotiable note. It would seem that to throw out a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
partial summary judgment, the court would need to explain this 
departure from the trial court's action. The trial court treated 
the documents independently. Respondents1 Briefed this issue on 
pages 7 through 12 of the Respondents' Brief filed October 3, 
1983. 
The form of the jury verdict was determined by the court 
after the trial evidence was in. The judge concluded that under 
the facts presented, Defendants1 only possibility for recovery 
was if the Plaintiff was guilty of unfair competition and the 
Defendants had not breached the purchase agreement. The special 
verdict form asked whether none, either or both parties breached 
the purchase agreement. It did not ask about breach of the 
promissory note, which the trial court considered to be a separ-
ate document, and severable from the agreement. Defendants1 
liability on the note had been ruled on by the court's March 15, 
1983 Memorandum Decision which recites the Defendants had 
acknowledged, in chambers prior to trial, their obligation on the 
note, plus interest. In its July 15, 1987 Opinion this court did 
not find the promissory note to be either conditional or in-
definite, as it found in Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Company, 717 P2d. 
697 (Utah 1986) . For that reason, it was altogether proper for 
the trial court to grant the partial summary judgment. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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II. 
DEFENDANTS COULD NOT RECOVER ON 
THEIR COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANTS — 
THEMSELVES BREACHED THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
Although the partial summary judgment reserved certain 
affirmative defenses to be presented at trial, most were resolved 
before trial. By the time trial was over, the court was well 
aware that there was no evidence on certain points, and that 
others had been waived. For example, the issue of personal 
liability on the note was resolved by stipulation before trial in 
chambers. The court in its pre-trial conference determined to 
allow the Plaintiffs to attempt to pierce Defendants1 corporate 
bail. To avoid this, Defendants stipulated that any judgment 
could be entered against all the Defendants. The judgment entered 
after the jury verdict reflects that. In contesting some of the 
findings of the court after the verdict, the Defendants at one 
pofnt presented their own form for the final judgment. Even 
their proposed form of the judgment provided joint and several 
liability against all the Defendants. Thus, the issue of joint 
liability was resolved, properly included, and should not be an 
issue in a new trial. 
Another affirmative defense was to been failure to give 
proper credit. However, the Court did not find enough evidence 
for that issue to present it to the jury. Thus, the remaining 
Counterclaim question to go before the jury would be if one party 
unfairly competed with the other. The court ruled as a matter of 
law, in making the jury verdict form, that if there was a mutual Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunte  Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
breach that neither party would recover for unfair competition. 
There had been no evidence of actual damages by Defendants on 
that point. In all cases, the trial court found all the affirma-
tive defenses applied to the purchase agreement dated June 27, 
1979, and not the promissory note. 
A. MUTUAL BREACH ESTOPPED DEFENDANTS1 COUNTERCLAIM 
Since the only remaining affirmative defense for considera-
tion by the jury was unfair competition, the court properly 
estopped both parties from recovering if the other also breached. 
This is fundamental law. A person who has broken a contract 
cannot enforce it or recover on it. See Lowe v Rosen1of, 12 U2d 
190, 364 P2d 418 (1961). In addition, even if the Plaintiffs 
breached the non-competition portion of the agreement as the 
Defendants did, that should not be a reason for a new trial as an 
offset to the note, because the note is separate. 
A parties' failure to perform an independent 
stipulation of a contract does not bar his 
right to recover for the other parties' 
breach, or excuse such other party from 
performing the stipulations made by him. 
17A CJS Contracts, Section 453 
Furthermore, the trial judge's ruling that if both parties 
breached the agreement the Defendants would not be able to 
recover on their Counterclaim, is consistent with general law as 
stated at 17A CJS Contracts, Section 473, that "a breach of 
contract by one party may be such as to permit the other party to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
abandon it and to sue at once for his entire damages•" Thus, 
since the Plaintiffs had accepted a negotiable note, their entire 
damages was the unpaid purchase price, which was primarily for 
the equipment to which Defendants had already given a secured 
interest to a lender other than the Plaintiffs. Utah has 
recognized severability of contracts in Green v. Palfreyman, 109 
Utah 291, 166 P2d 215 (Rehearing denied 109 U 308, 175 P2d 213) 
(1946) , which held: 
Where there has been a breach by one party of 
a severable part of a contract, the other 
party is not excused from performance of his 
promises relating to other parts of the 
contract. . . . If there was a breach by 
Plaintiff, it does not justify a forfeiture 
of his share of profits under the contract 
. . . id* 219 
The special form of verdict asking for the jury to rule on 
whether either, both or neither party had breached was adequate 
for other reasons, which makes a need for re-trial moot. In 
Schick v. Ashton 7 U2d 152, 320 P2d 664 (1958) and Commercial 
Security Bank v. Hodson 15 U2d 388, 393 P2d 482 (1964), this 
court said whether promisor has made and kept his promise is a 
jury question where the evidence is in conflict, and that it is a 
jury question to determine whether damages were suffered and the 
contract breached. The general rule which must be read with 
these holdings is that it is a question of law whether particular 
facts amount to a breach; and, that it is a question of fact 
whether the particular facts in fact occurred. 17A CJS Contracts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Section 630. In this particular trial, neither side objected to 
the judge's decision to allow the jury to decide whether a breach 
had taken place. Even though the jury said both sides breached 
the purchase agreement, it is still a question of law whether the 
acts are a breach of the contract. The trial judge, having 
everything before him, decided neither side would be entitled to 
recover for damages for the unfair competition element, the only 
element remaining in the affirmative defenses, if the jury found 
both breached. There is no need for a remand or reversal of the 
jury's decision or the entry of the judgment in this fact 
situation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was justified by the facts before it in 
deciding the note was separately enforceable from the purchase 
agreement. Plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment. 
During the trial it became apparent that the only Counterclaim 
issue for the injury was breach of the purchase agreement. The 
law applied to the facts justified the Court's conclusion that 
there should be no recovery on the Counterclaim if Defendants 
also breached. All issues raised in the Counterclaim were 
considered at the trial or were waived by the parties. The trial 
court correctly ruled that the Defendants were estopped or had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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waived any right to recover on their Counterclaim in the context 
of this trial# The Petitioners respectfully request the court 
rehear the matter, and affirm the judgment as entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 23rd day of July, 1987. 
,J?Dl/a&2/ 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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